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Far more general than upon most subjects has been the agree-
ment reached by competent thinkers that Science is essentially a
method of investigation. Of course there have been, and there are
today, a number of alternative investigatory methods olther than that
of Science, just as there are entirely legitimate logics other than that
of the syllogism. But Science today is by far the most publicized
method in our world, and one concerning which not alone the unin-
formed man in the street.but a great number of highly competent
scientists also hold a singularly touching faith.
This credulity has not sprung up iby reason of any mere perver-
sity. It is a fact that scientific speculations have often unwittingly
eventuated in the most practical results, some very beneficial and
some equally destructive; and it is an even more impressive fact
that scientific speculations have produced the same sort of practical
application when they were deliberately prosecuted to that end.
There are those who would rely upon this circumstance as the only
justification required but they are not among the greatest scientists
nor do they constitute anything like a majority.
For Science is a method of investigation. A method for investi-
gating what? The nature of reality, we are told. What, then, is
the method that Science applies to this project? Its method com-
prises four steps:
(1) The accumulation or observation of a large number o'f data
appropriate to any given phenomenon.
(2) The construction. of an hypothesis sutbsuming large numbers
of the data into a generalization or (if sufficiently broad) a general
"law." This stage commences with an intuitive flash, a hunch; the
suggestion is then carefully formulated as a formal hypothesis; there
follows the rigorous deduction from the hypothesis of such deduced
consequences or theorems as verbal syllogistic logic demands must
follow, given the correctness ofthe hypothesis; among these deduced
consequences those specific ones are sought upon which there exists
no present knowledge regarding their occurrence or non-occurrence.
(3) The setting up of an experimental procedure by which the
occurrence or the non-occurrence of the last-mentioned deduced con-YALE JOURNAL OF BIOLOGY AND MEDICINE
sequences of the hypothesis may be demonstrated. At this point
syllogistic logic assumes a minor role and we enter the primary field
of the logic of Solvitur Ambulando, an equally legitimate logical
method, complementary to the first.
(4) The demonstration as to the occurrence or the non-occur-
rence of thegiven deduced consequences.
Behind the application of this method which is called Science
there lie three assumptions or formal premises, essential in the orig-
inal meaning of that adjective as pointing to a definfng process.
The firs,t premise cannot be better put than in the words of
Einstein:2 "The belief in an external world independent of the per-
ceiving subject is the basis of all natural science." The second
premise iss that a correct statement of any phenomenon is such a
formulation as bears a one-to-one relationship to the actual (not
necessarily the perceived) reality of that phenomenon. The third
premise is that the scienitific method holds out the possibility of
providing the kind of formulations defined in the second premise.
And to this third premise there exists a corollary: that the method
is valid when applied to any specific field of inquiry, whether it be
botany or electrodynamics or psychology or what-not; this follows
from the consideration that Science qua Science is a general method
ofcareful procedure.
Niow with these three premises and the four defined methodo-
logical steps let us see what the alleged justifications of Science may
be. They are of two fundamental kinds, a valid justification of a
negative character and an invalid justification of a positive sort.
Certainly Science dispels ignorance. When the deduced conse-
quences of an hypothesis are demonstrated to be characterized by
non-occurrence, it is shown conclusively that the hypothesis is incor-
rect, i.e., that it does not bear a one-to-one correspondence to the
actual reality under investigation. This is the valid negative justi-
fication. The positive justification consistsinthe assertion that when
the deduced consequences of any hypothesis are demonstrated to
occur, then that hypothesis is shiown to be a correct formulaition of
reality; and this justification is as surely false as the previous one
was sound.
As to both of these arguments their logic has been exhaustively
treated in the logical analysis of the hypothetical syllogism.' In the
second case it is shown that the occurrence of the deduced conse-
quence does notdemonstrate that its occurrence is due to the validity
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of the original hypothesis, since ilt may also have occurred in accord-
ance with a quite different (in extreme cases an opposite) hypothesis,
from which the same consequence is equally deducible through the
operations of syllogistic logic. The fallacy here involved is called
technically the Fallacy of Affirming the Consequent, and attention
has been called to it hitherto, by other writers. "This analysis shows
that whereas the argument inthecase of the fal;sification ofascientific
theory is formally valid, that in the case of its confirmation is logi-
cally invalid, since it commits what logicians term the fallacy of
affirming the consequent. We find ourselvestherefore in this some-
what shocking situation: the method which natural science uses to
check the postulationally prescribed theories in its more mature stage
of development is absolutely trustworthy when the proposed theory
is not confirmed but logically inconclusive when the theory is experi-
mentally confirmed."5
It is submitted that here we confront a circumstance deservedly
painful to scientists, since it offers conclusive evidence that no single
positive finding of Science, nor all of them together, have any final
claim upon the acceptance of rational men. When it is said that
Science has proved something, no one of us who is rational is under
any obligation to assent; indeed as rational beings we are obligated
to deny. We must seriously face the fact that what we confront
here is no mere verbalistictwisting of words but a flaw in the under-
lying liogical validity of the scientific 'method itself. The third
premise of Science is shown to be incorrect by a rigorous analysis of
the very method which is one of its terms.
Nor can we gain much encouragement from the devices whereby
scientists themselves seem accustomed to meet the situation: (a) by
disregardingit; (b) 'by begging the question; (c) by the construction
of additional safeguards which look plausible at first glance but
which, when in'turn analyzed rigorously, prove their failure to over-
come the di'fficulty.
It would serve no proper purpose to discuss (a) or (b); but (c)
is a more respectable undertaking. The most careful solution ofthis
character has ibeen descriibed in detail by Northrop. "A frank facing
of the presence of the fallacy of affirming the consequent has caused
physical scientists to supplement the method of verification of phys-
ical theories as indicated above, by an additional scientific proce-
dure. . . Scientists concluded that one can avoid the danger implicit
in accepting a theory upon the basis of an argument which commits
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a formal, logical fallacy, providing we can supplement the mere
experimental confirmation of a given theory wilth theoretical con-
siderations going to show that this theory, to some extent at least,
is unique in its capacity to give rise deductively to the confirmed
consequences... To approximate toward the uniqueness of a deduc-
tively-formulated scientific theory it is necessary not merely to have
experimental confirmation but also a theoretical investiga-tion of
every conceivable theoretical possibility... The point is that a scien-
tific theory carries very much more certainty if one can say not
merely that its deductively-formulated theorems have been con-
firmed, but also that after one has investigated all the conceivable or
imaginable possibilities, it is the only one of these possibilities known
to date which is confirmed. In fact, this is the only precise way to
define a crucial experiment. Such an experiment is not merely one
which confirms a given scientific theory; it is, instead, one of a char-
acter such that while confirming one theory it repudiates others. . .
The point is that the mere experimental confirmation of a scientific
theorythrough its deduced consequences is not generally accepted by
competent scientists as a sufficient criterion of the scientific validity
of that theory. One must go further and show as far as possible
that thetheory in question is the only one which is capable, through
its deductive consequences, of taking care of the natural history
data. . . In the case of confirmation a theoretical investigation of
alternative hypotheses is pursued, with the purpose of showing as
far as is possible not merely that a given theory is confirmed by the
data, but also that it is the only theory which is so confirmed."6
The italics in the above quotation are not its author's but ours;
by reference to them it is seen immediately what is the matter with
this solution. In the first place, you cannot qualify a logical neces-
sity; and it is of no avail to say that such an objection is perfectionist,
for after you have said it, you still cannot qualify a logical necessity.
All the phrases such as "to someextent," "as far aspossible," and the
like would have to be omitted in order to m.ake the above technique
valid; and it is just those omissions which honesty forbids. In the
second place, a crucial experiment is not quite as defined above nor
has Science everperformed areallycrucial experiment, forthe reason
that the latter is noot simply one which confirms a given theory while
repud;iating others but, instead, one that confirms a given theory
while repudiating all others. And in the third place, it is just this
truly perfectionist demand in the offered solution which renders it
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actually impractical and impossible. It is easy enough to write
"every conceivable possibility" and "all conceivable or imaginable
possibilities" but it is quite another matter actually to be able to take
all of these into real a-ccount. The truth, of course, is that no indi-
vidual scientist, nor any possible number of them together, can
accomplish any such feat; we have only to reflect upon what may
happen one hundred or five hundred years hence in the matter of
currently unguessed hypotheses in order to realize the plain impossi-
bility of this recommendation. Thus, even if we were generous
enough to remit the emasculating qualifications already in the sug-
gestion, it would still remain that since the suggestion is one which
cannot be carried out, it must fail to provide a solution that can be
carried out. But for all practical purposes a solution that cannot be
carried out is no solution at all.
In almost all branches of science the mentioned predicament
seems plain but it may -be said that in physics at any rate the alterna-
tives to the postulates which are indirectly verified through the
theorems are better accounted for. This is because mathematical
physicists can put their 'laws' in tensor form such that they must
hold for many possible transmissions of coordinates and for various
types of geometries, as Lobachevskian, Riemannian, Euclidean, and
so on. Even yet., tho-ugh, "many possible itransmissi.ons" are not all
possible transmissions nor are various types of geometries all possible
types of geometries. To mention merely one circumstance, the usual
form of tensor equation used to formulate such physical laws may
contain, for example, sufficient giks to deal with a four-dimensional
space-time continuum; 'but if the real world "independent of the
observer,' which physics is atitempting to investigate, should com-
prise a six-dimensional rather than a four-dimensional continuum
(which there is reason to suspect), it remains to be seen how many
of the presently accepted physical 'laws' would survive in their
present form when so treated. And that, of course, is only a single
case out of other possibilities, all of which it is impossible even to
verbalize today.
We have here, then, one of those dilemmas which, because of
its apparent 'insolubility, everyone naturally wishes to deny by the
unsuccessful means of overlooking it. The writer does not believe
that anything real is ever disposed of by such a means and he has an
alternative, if somewhat unorthodox, proposal to make. In short,
h-e submits that there exists an actually possible solution for the case.
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What is the core of the difficulty that has produced this painful
failure of Science to guarantee its findings? It does not reside in
the deduced theorelms or consequences of an hypothesis; these can
be checked rigorously and they can be logically valid. The real
difficulty lies in the uncheckalble premises of the deductions and thus
finally in the hunch, or intuitive flash, from wvhich the whole thing
starts. We must inquire into the possibility of check and counter-
check just here.
It is clear that the originating hunch involved in Step 2 of the
scientific method is the result of an inductive process, whether or not
of a "conscious" inductive process; and we see that the complete
scientific method is a matter of Perduction, i.e., the successive
employment oif Induction and Deduction in a defined sequence.
Only Steps 2 and 3 claim attention here: Step 3 involves Deduction
and this process can be rigorously and logically checked; but the
preceding Induction is not in so fortunate a case and cannot be
checked at all, much less rigorously. The hasty idea thatt a success-
ful upshot of the original notion (the experimental confirmation of
the formal hypothesis) validates the hunch is merely mistaken; it
has justbeen shown that that is precisely what it does not do. Thus
thecomplete process ofPerduction falls through, due to the uncheck-
ability of its inductive portion. We are forced to ask what means
can be devised for the validation of a given induction. Logicians
can help us here only in part.
We must inquire into the grounds which cause any given induc-
tion to be either correct or incorrect, into the circumstances which
are linked with logical validity in the inductive process. We shall
find them, of course, to be different from the grounds that make a
deductive process logically valid. Or perhaps they are not really
so different, after all. Naturally the logical procedures of the two
forms of reasoning are not the same; in a sense they are opposites
and in this respect the two problems differ diametrically. But let
us consider another aspect of correct Deduction that seems unde-
niable: a correct deduction can be drawn only by one who himself is
able to reason correctly in accordance with the logical necessities of
the deductive process. In the realm of reason those necessities no
more depend upon the abilities or the disabilities of a given reasoner
than does the nature of external (or any) reality depend upon the
idiosyncrasies of a given perceiver. This "independence from the
sulbject," we recall, is one of the basic postulates of Science itself.
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What, then, is the comparable criterion of a correct Induction?
Simply that it be made by one who is able to reason correctly in
accordance with thelogical necessities of the indudtive process. Here
the logician can help us, for he can inform us as to what those logical
necessities are and, if we wish to take the trouble, we can check the
inductions from which the hypothesis originates, in a rigorous man-
ner. This demands one further characteristic, namely, that the
Induction be a conscious process on the part of the theorist but, when
the hypothesis is made formal, it usually is so and it becomes legiti-
mate to demand that it always be so.
But the question that really concerns us is not quite so artless as
that. The hypothesis whose validity as an hypothesis we are trying
to check, is at the same time the premise of the deductions to be
experimentally tested. In other words we are really investigating
the validity of a premise and we cannot stop merely with the single
premise which is the hypothesis, for the reason that the inductive
process from which the hypothesis is built, itself involves other
premises of its own. If we have appreciated the requirement that
premises themselves must ibe checked, we cannot stop half-w.ay; the
premises of a given induction must rigorously 'be checked also. lf
the premises be true the conclusion follows; to eliminate the "if,"
i.e., to reduce inconclusiveness to certainty, both the induction and
its own premises must be validated. It is now that we meet the
real crux of the problem and it is now that the logician no longer
can aid us.
The premises of the induction from which the hypothesis arises
are not of an intrinsically mysterious character. They are simply
past experien.ces, previously disconnected, of the inductive reasoner.
Suddenly these display an unexpected and hitherto unrecognized
relationship and instantaneously the hunch occurs. A great many
hunches are demonstrably incorrect. Wlhy? Providing the induc-
tive process itself is correct (and this can be logically checked), it
is because the past experiences, the induotive premises, are them-
selves incorrect perceptions, i.e., such that they do not bear a one-
to-one relationship to the actual reality of the "external world inde-
pendent of the perceiving subject." Our problem now becomes one
of distinguishing between correct and incorrect perceptions.
Two previously unrelated facts suddenly become pertinent;
indeed they become complementary. (A) Strictly speaking, no
external perception is correct by the criterion of Science; the world
547YALE JOURNAL OF BIOLOGY AND MEDICINE
of external perception is a world of sensory illusion, standing
urgently in need of theoretical and rational interpretation. (B)
Strictly speaking, no observed man is normal and therefore he can-
not be said 'to be a normal perceiver by the criterion of Science; any
perceiver,'including ourselves, is delmonstrably abnormal in certain
ways and no present guarantee exists that he is not also abnormal in
just the pertinent way now required. The normal is here defined
as tthat which functions in accordance with ilts inherent design, a
definition defended elsewhere.3
Can we,.then, devise some means to distinguish when and under
what circumstances a given perceiver is a normal perceiver and thus
when his inductive premises are correct? The first objection to the
proposal can be refuted: a perception experieniced by a really normal
man must 'be, for the human race, a correct perception. It may not
be so for an angel or for an earthworm but for humans ilt must be
so because the perceiver is then perceiving in accordance with his
inherent design and beyond this no creature, including man, can go,
by definitioin.
But the assertion of physical scientists now becomes apposite,
viz., th.at any perception is ipso facto illusory and stands in need o'f
the mental oonstructs 'of scientific theory in order that it be amended
more correctly. It is not quilte dear, perhaps, how a physicist, for
instance, becomes an authority on a question which is as plainly and
simply a matter calling for psychological, not physical, opinion, as
any may be. Although we can all agree with the physi'cist when
his assertion refers to an abnormal, i.e., the usual, perceiver, we must
do so on common sense grounds rather than professional grounds
and the dictum of physical scientists in this matter possesses no scien-
tific standing whatever when we confront the hypothetical case of a
normal perceiver.
A preliminary analysis has, in fact, been made of the problem of
the human paradic.4 It is there shown that th'e actually observed
subject's abnormality resides, in the final sifting, in the curiously
lethargic and passive type of consciousness manifested by contem-
porary man and implicitly denied 'by the dharacter o'f his own
inherent design as an 'organism. A further deductive consequence
of this position demons-trates logically that an active application of
the subject's pure awareness to the organic phenomena first and
directly of his own biological organism leads eventually, and under
the proper safeguards, to a very different kin'd of perceiving than
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that with which physical scentists, like the rest of us, are acquainted.
(Itis shownlikewise that the "unconscious" units inductively related
in the hunch need no longer be "unconscious.") Does this type of
perceiving stand in need of further amendment by mental constructs
or scientific abstractions? Theoretically and in rational logic it does
not. But experimental results so far are too meagre and have not
been sufficiently well validated tojustify theircitation now in support
of the position.
Nevertheless, the applicability of this new type of perception to
the present problem seems plain. The 'selff'-the first term of the
three-termed reality, 'self'-onsciousness-object-can never of course
know itself; indeed the 'self' can never even dbserve the 'self.' But
what the 'self' can do is to observe the organic mechanism, the body,
to which it is related and with which a peculiarly intimate relation-
ship is already established by reason of the nature of the real world
of which both it and the organic mechanism are parts. Moreover,
there is no ascertainable limit to the activity of this kind in which
the 'self' can take part. And finally, within the organic mechanism
there reside all the data and units of physics but this time the units
are the real physical units of the real world, not simply the hypo--
thetical and indirectly verifiable units, such as electrons, mesatrons,
etc., of science. There is plainly a vital difference between a direct
,nxperience of the phenomena of the real physical units of the real
world and'an hypothesis concerning what the nature of theoretically
invented units of this kind may be. A great many safeguards need
to be thrown around any such psychological investigation, there are
a great many qualifications which must be adhered to without equi-
vocation and some of them are certainly iof a scientific kind, but the
point is that such an investigation is not in any sense hypothetical
nor does it include theory of any kind to call for the indirect verifi-
cation which is the method of science. For that very reason there
is nowhere in the procedure that the fallacy of affirming the conse-
quent can arise. And it is the latter fallacy that concerns us pri-
marily here.
On the broader point-finally to decide this question of the
human norm is atask of psychology which is not atall met by statisti-
cal or other investigations into the characteristics of men as they now
(abnormally) are found. It is objected then that psychology is noit
prosecuting this task. But it may equally be answered in turn that
no insurmountable obstacle prevents psychology from employing the
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scientific method for that very purpose. The objection is far from
a rebuttal, it is a reproach.
The question as to the real character of the human norm, as
distinguished entirely from the quite different question as to the
actual human average or median, is a difficult, lengthy, and subtle
one, depending primarily upon the detailed discovery of the basic
human paradic. But it is nowhere shown that this question is inca-
pable of solution; it is only stated-and alas, truthfully-that no
general efforts are being made in that direction. Yet it is difficult
to think of a more important problem or one more legitimately
psydhological. Here we have discussed simply one aspect of its
importance: until it is solved, Science itself remains without any final
validation and all its positive findings suspect of falsity but without
any alternative suggestion as to how they may rationally be
guaranteed.
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